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A critical flaw tracked as CVE-2026-123550 affects the SAML v2.0 service provider in OpenAM before 16.1.4. Under a specific setting, the service provider accepts SAML assertions that carry no signature, so a remote attacker with no account can submit a forged assertion and receive a session as another user, including an administrator.

If you run OpenAM as your single sign-on layer, or you manage applications that trust an OpenAM server, this is worth checking today. The details below come from the GitHub Advisory Database entry, and the same description appears in the NVD record, which repeats it rather than confirming it independently.

What happened

The advisory was published on November 8, 2026. It describes an authentication bypass in the SAML v2.0 service provider component of OpenAM. When the setting WantAssertionsSigned is false, the service provider accepts unsigned assertions on two bindings: ECP (PAOS) and HTTP-Artifact.

Per the advisory, unauthenticated remote attackers can submit forged assertions to obtain sessions as any mapped user, including administrators, and can hijack single sign-on to dependent applications. That last point matters: a compromised identity layer does not stay contained to one app.

Only one independent publisher covers this story so far, and the advisory is marked Unreviewed in the GitHub Advisory Database. The NVD entry repeats the same text. Treat details beyond the advisory description, such as exact configurations and fixed builds, as unconfirmed until the vendor advisories are checked.

Why unsigned assertions are dangerous

In SAML single sign-on, an identity provider vouches for a user by sending the service provider an assertion. The signature is what proves the assertion really came from the trusted identity provider and was not altered. If a service provider accepts assertions without checking a signature, anyone who can reach the endpoint can write their own assertion that says "this is the administrator".

This class of problem is listed as CWE-290, authentication bypass by spoofing. The CVSS v4 metrics in the advisory describe network attack vector, low attack complexity, no attack requirements, no privileges and no user interaction, with high impact to confidentiality, integrity and availability of the vulnerable system. In plain terms: it can be attempted remotely, without credentials, and without tricking anyone.

Who is exposed

Based on the advisory wording, exposure needs these conditions together:

  • OpenAM is running a version before 16.1.4.
  • The SAML v2.0 service provider functionality is in use.
  • WantAssertionsSigned is set to false.
  • The ECP (PAOS) or HTTP-Artifact binding is reachable by the attacker.

The research does not say what the default value of WantAssertionsSigned is, so do not assume you are safe or affected without looking at your own configuration. Internet-facing OpenAM servers and those reachable from partner or guest networks are the highest priority. Applications that rely on the server for login, such as intranets, admin panels and customer portals, inherit the risk.

How to check your exposure

Start by finding out which OpenAM version you run and whether any SAML service provider configuration has assertion signing turned off. The version is shown in the OpenAM administration console, and in your deployment records if you use packaged builds.

Then review each SAML v2.0 service provider entity in the console and look for the WantAssertionsSigned setting. The exact menu path can vary by version, so follow your own OpenAM documentation. Record every entity where it is false.

If you front OpenAM with a web server or reverse proxy, search its access log for requests to the SAML endpoints that look out of place. This command counts log lines containing "saml" (case-insensitive) in an nginx access log, so you can spot unusual volume. Adjust the log path for your system; a high count on its own is not proof of abuse.

Count SAML-related requests in an nginx access log (read-only, run on the proxy or web server)Shell
grep -ci 'saml' /var/log/nginx/access.log

Also review OpenAM's own session and audit logs for administrator sessions that do not match a real login by your staff, especially from unfamiliar IP addresses.

What to do now

  1. Inventory every OpenAM server and note its version.
  2. Upgrade to OpenAM 16.1.4 or later, following the project's release notes and your change process.
  3. Check each SAML v2.0 service provider configuration and set WantAssertionsSigned to true where your identity providers support signed assertions.
  4. If you cannot upgrade immediately, restrict network access to the ECP (PAOS) and HTTP-Artifact endpoints to the systems that genuinely need them.
  5. Review recent administrator and privileged sessions for logins you cannot explain, and end any suspicious sessions.
  6. If you find signs of forged logins, rotate secrets and credentials for the affected OpenAM instance and review the applications that trust it.
  7. Read the OpenIdentityPlatform security advisory and the VulnCheck write-up for any configuration guidance.
Caution. Upgrading or changing SAML settings on a production identity server can interrupt logins for every dependent application. Test in staging first and schedule a maintenance window. Setting WantAssertionsSigned to true can break sign-in with an identity provider that does not sign its assertions, so confirm that before changing it.

Detection and monitoring afterwards

Because the flaw yields valid-looking sessions, detection relies on spotting behavior that does not fit. Alert on new administrator sessions outside working hours, sessions created without a matching authentication event at your identity provider, and sudden access to many dependent applications from one source.

Keep an eye on the exposed surface too. Webforta Monitor can watch uptime, certificates, DNS and header changes on your login hostnames, which helps you notice unexpected changes around an identity server, though it does not inspect SAML traffic. For general guidance on reviewing a site after suspicious access, see how to check if a website is hacked and what to do if your website is hacked.

What is still unknown

  • Whether the flaw is being exploited. The research reports no exploitation and the CVE is not listed in CISA KEV.
  • The precise set of affected release lines. GitHub marks affected and patched versions as unknown, and the description only says "before 16.1.4".
  • Whether any workaround exists besides enforcing signed assertions and limiting network access. The research does not describe an official one.

We treat the advisory description as the baseline and recommend checking the vendor pages above for updates.

Sources

This article is based on the public sources below. Details can change as vendors and researchers publish more; check the original advisories before acting on version numbers.

  1. CVE-2026-123550 - GitHub Advisory Databasegithub.com
  2. CVE-2026-123550: OpenAM before 16.1.4 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in its SAML v2.0 service provider that accepts unsigned assertions on the ECP (PAOS) and…nvd.nist.gov ·
  • OpenAM
  • SAML
  • SSO
  • authentication bypass
  • CVE-2026-123550