On this page (8 sections)

A path traversal vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-133501, has been published for Gladys Assistant, the open source home automation platform. It affects versions up to and including 4.71.0, can be reached over the network, and the advisory says a public exploit has been released. The fix is in version 4.72.0.

If you run Gladys on a home server, a Raspberry Pi or a small business network, and especially if its web interface is reachable from the internet, you should plan an upgrade now.

At a glance

What happened

The vulnerability was published on November 20, 2026 through the National Vulnerability Database and mirrored in the GitHub Advisory Database. The description says the flaw sits in an unknown function of the file server/lib/gateway/gateway.downloadBackup.js, part of the Backup Restore Handler component. Manipulating input to that code results in path traversal, and the attack can be launched remotely.

The advisory says the exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. It points to an upstream issue in the Gladys repository and to the v4.72.0 release, which it names as the version that fixes the problem. The entry was also catalogued by VulDB.

Only one independent publisher covers this story so far. The NVD record repeats the same description as the GitHub advisory, so it is not separate confirmation. The GitHub entry is marked unreviewed, and its affected and patched version fields are listed as unknown, so the version range here comes from the description text.

What path traversal means here

Path traversal (CWE-22) happens when an application builds a file path from user-supplied input without strictly limiting where that path may point. By including directory-climbing sequences or absolute paths, a caller can make the application read or write files outside the folder it was meant to use.

The affected file name suggests a backup download or restore feature, which normally deals with files in a dedicated backup directory. The sources do not say exactly which parameter is abused, whether the flaw allows reading files, writing them, or both, or what a successful attack would expose. Treat those details as unconfirmed rather than assuming a specific outcome.

How severe is it?

The 8.5 score is a CVSS v4 base score. The listed metrics are: network attack vector, low attack complexity, no special attack requirements, low privileges required, passive user interaction, and high impact to confidentiality, integrity and availability for both the vulnerable and subsequent systems. In plain terms, an attacker needs some low-level access, but no unusual conditions, and the potential impact is broad.

The low privileges requirement matters. It suggests an authenticated account may be needed, though the description itself does not say how authentication works for this handler. Do not assume the instance is safe just because it requires a login.

Who is affected

  • Any Gladys Assistant instance running version 4.71.0 or earlier.
  • Instances reachable from the internet, through port forwarding, a reverse proxy or a tunnel, face the most realistic risk because the attack is network based.
  • Instances that are only reachable on a trusted home or office LAN have lower exposure, but a compromised device on the same network could still reach them.

Gladys often holds sensitive context: device integrations, credentials for smart home services, location and presence data. A file access flaw in such a system is worth taking seriously even though the sources do not describe the exact impact.

How to check your exposure

First confirm which version you run. In the Gladys web interface, the version is normally shown in the settings or system area. If you deploy with containers, also check which image tag your deployment is pinned to, since a tag such as latest may not have been pulled recently.

Next, check whether the service is reachable from outside your network. This read-only command lists listening TCP ports on a Linux host so you can see whether Gladys is bound to all interfaces. Run it on the server and look for the port your Gladys instance uses:

List listening TCP ports on a Linux host (run on the Gladys server)Shell
ss -tlnp

Then review your router, firewall and reverse proxy configuration for port forwards or public hostnames that lead to Gladys. An external port scan from a network you do not control will show what the internet can actually see.

What to do now

  1. Back up your Gladys data and configuration before changing anything.
  2. Upgrade Gladys Assistant to version 4.72.0, following the project's normal update process for your install method.
  3. Confirm the new version number in the interface after the update.
  4. If you cannot upgrade immediately, remove internet exposure: close port forwards or restrict access to a VPN or an allowlist of trusted addresses.
  5. Make sure the Gladys web interface is not published without authentication in front of it, and use strong, unique passwords for every Gladys account.
  6. Review user accounts and remove any you do not recognize.
  7. Rotate credentials and API tokens stored in Gladys integrations if you suspect the instance was reachable and exposed while vulnerable.
  8. Check reverse proxy or web server logs for unusual requests to backup-related endpoints, especially ones containing repeated parent-directory sequences.
Caution. Upgrading restarts the service and may briefly interrupt your home automation routines. Take a backup first and schedule the change when a short outage is acceptable.

If you use a reverse proxy such as nginx, this search looks through its access log for encoded or literal parent-directory sequences. It is read-only and a match is only a lead to investigate, not proof of compromise. The log path below is the common default on Debian and Ubuntu, so adjust it for your setup:

Search an nginx access log for traversal-style requests (Debian/Ubuntu default path)Shell
grep -E '\.\./|%2e%2e' /var/log/nginx/access.log

Detection and monitoring

Because a working exploit is public, assume scanning for exposed Gladys instances is possible. Keep an eye on the following after you patch:

  • Unexpected outbound connections from the Gladys host.
  • New or modified files outside the Gladys data and backup directories.
  • Logins from unfamiliar addresses, or new accounts and API keys.
  • Repeated requests to backup or restore endpoints in proxy logs.

If the instance sits behind a public hostname, certificate and DNS monitoring can show unexpected changes to that hostname. Webforta Monitor covers uptime, certificate, DNS and header changes, and the free SSL checker lets you review the certificate your public endpoint presents. These do not detect this flaw itself. For general guidance on reducing exposure, see Small business website security.

Timeline

Known dates from the research
DateEvent
2026-11-20CVE-2026-133501 published by NVD and added to the GitHub Advisory Database
2026-11-20Advisory states version 4.72.0 fixes the issue and that an exploit has been released publicly

The sources do not give the date of the upstream fix, the date the exploit was first published, or any evidence of attacks in the wild.

Sources

This article is based on the public sources below. Details can change as vendors and researchers publish more; check the original advisories before acting on version numbers.

  1. CVE-2026-133501 - GitHub Advisory Databasegithub.com
  2. CVE-2026-133501: A security flaw has been discovered in Gladys Assistant up to 4.71.0.nvd.nist.gov ·
  • Gladys Assistant
  • path traversal
  • CVE-2026-133501
  • self-hosted
  • patching