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A critical flaw in Flyto2 Core, the Python execution kernel for automation and AI-agent workflows, lets a caller who can run modules or recipes write attacker-controlled content to arbitrary paths on the host. It is tracked as CVE-2026-77312 and exists because an earlier fix was applied to only some of the file-writing modules. The issue is fixed in flyto-core 2.26.8.

If you run flyto-core on a server, especially with its MCP server or recipe engine reachable from other systems or users, you should check your version now. At the time of writing, only one independent publisher covers this story, and the details below come from the GitHub advisory and the CVE record, so treat them as coming from one primary source.

What happened

Flyto2 Core confines file output to a directory set by the FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR environment variable. An earlier vulnerability, CVE-2026-67429 (GHSA-2956-977x-2w3r in the advisory), was an arbitrary file write that the project patched in v2.26.6. According to the GitHub advisory, that patch added a path check to a hand-picked list of modules such as image and document tools, but not to the data.* and file.* write families.

CVE-2026-77312 covers the gap. The modules named are data.csv.write, data.json_to_csv, file.copy and file.move, and the advisory says the broader data.*, file.* and report-writer families that do not call the path guard are also affected. A caller can pass an absolute path and the module writes there, outside the sandbox.

Technical details

The root cause, as the advisory describes it, is architectural: confinement was enforced per module by calling a function named validate_path_with_env_config(), not once in a central place. Any module that omits the call is entirely unconfined, and there is no central enforcement of output paths in the runtime.

  • data.csv.write only rejects paths containing the substring "..". That is a denylist, and it does not block absolute paths.
  • data.json_to_csv, file.copy and file.move have no path check at all, according to the advisory.
  • The attack surface is the recipe engine and the MCP server's execute_module call. The advisory says the HTTP MCP surface is unauthenticated per CVE-2026-55786, which would lower the bar for reaching it; verify how your own deployment is exposed.

The impact is a write of attacker-chosen content to an attacker-chosen path. The GitHub advisory points to overwriting application code, recipes, shell startup files, cron files or SSH authorized_keys as routes to code execution on the host. This article does not reproduce the proof of concept published in the advisory.

The two severity figures differ: the CVE record shows CVSS 10, while the advisory text works out 9.3 under CVSS v3.1. Both are Critical. Plan around the higher urgency either way.

Who is affected

Anyone running flyto-core 2.26.7 or earlier from PyPI. The required privilege is low: any client able to run a module or recipe. That includes shared automation platforms, AI-agent setups where untrusted prompts or users can trigger module calls, and any deployment where the MCP server is reachable over a network. A single-user local install with no exposed interface is at lower risk, but still should be updated.

Because file writes happen with the privileges of the flyto-core process, the damage depends on what that account can modify. A service running as root, or with write access to its own install directory and a home directory with SSH keys, gives an attacker the most to work with.

How to check your exposure

This read-only command lists the installed flyto-core version in the current Python environment. Look for a version of 2.26.7 or lower.

Check the installed flyto-core version (run inside the same virtualenv or container as the service)Shell
pip show flyto-core

If you manage several environments, repeat the check in each virtualenv and container image. Also review whether the MCP server or recipe execution is reachable from anything other than trusted localhost processes, and which operating system user runs it.

What to do now

Caution. Upgrading restarts or redeploys your automation service. Schedule it, and make sure running recipes can be interrupted safely.

This command upgrades flyto-core to the fixed release. Afterwards, pip show should report 2.26.8 or later.

Upgrade flyto-core to the patched versionShell
pip install --upgrade "flyto-core>=2.26.8"
  1. Upgrade every flyto-core install, container image and CI environment to 2.26.8 or later, then confirm with pip show flyto-core.
  2. Restart the service so the old code is no longer loaded.
  3. Restrict who and what can reach the MCP server and recipe engine: bind to localhost or a private network and require authentication in front of it.
  4. Run flyto-core as a dedicated low-privilege user that cannot write to its own code, shell startup files, cron directories or ~/.ssh.
  5. Make sure FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR is set to a dedicated directory that holds nothing sensitive.
  6. If the service was exposed while on 2.26.7 or earlier, review the files listed in the next section for unexpected changes before trusting the host.
  7. Rotate SSH keys and credentials on the host if you find signs of tampering.

Detection and monitoring

No exploitation has been reported in the research, so there are no published indicators. Look for the outcomes the advisory describes: unexpected modifications to files that give code execution.

  • Modification times and contents of flyto-core's own Python files and your .flyto recipe files.
  • Shell startup files such as ~/.bashrc for the service account, crontab entries, and ~/.ssh/authorized_keys.
  • Application logs for data.csv.write, data.json_to_csv, file.copy or file.move calls whose destination is an absolute path outside your sandbox directory.
  • Unexpected new outbound connections or processes started by the service account.

File integrity monitoring on those locations is a sound permanent control. If your automation host also serves web traffic, a free malware scan and the guidance in what to do if a website is hacked are useful follow-ups, though outside-in scans cannot see changes to files on the server itself.

Lessons for similar tools

The advisory describes this as an incomplete fix, so missing path confinement has now affected the same project twice. Per-module guards are fragile: every new module is a fresh chance to forget one. When you build or adopt agent tooling, prefer a single choke point that resolves and checks every output path, and treat a substring check for ".." as insufficient since absolute paths bypass it.

Further technical references are in the project's security advisory, the fix commit and the v2.26.8 release.

Sources

This article is based on the public sources below. Details can change as vendors and researchers publish more; check the original advisories before acting on version numbers.

  1. CVE-2026-77312 - GitHub Advisory Databasegithub.com
  • flyto-core
  • CVE-2026-77312
  • path traversal
  • MCP server
  • Python