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CVE-2026-124577 is an improper authentication weakness in the web management interface of the Intelbras SG 2404 PoE L2+ managed switch. According to the GitHub Advisory Database entry, it affects firmware 1.00.70 and 1.00.72, can be attacked remotely, and an exploit has been made public.
If you run this switch, especially with its management page reachable from outside a trusted network, plan a firmware upgrade to 1.00.74 and limit who can reach the admin interface in the meantime.
What happened
The advisory was published on November 9, 2026. It describes a weakness in an unknown function of the file /EXCU_SHELL in the switch's web management interface. By manipulating that component, a remote attacker can trigger improper authentication, meaning the device may accept access it should have refused. The same text says the exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks.
The advisory states that upgrading to version 1.00.74 is sufficient to fix the issue. It does not describe any workaround, and it names no affected versions beyond 1.00.70 and 1.00.72.
Technical details
Improper authentication (CWE-287) is a weakness class where software does not properly verify that a caller is who they claim to be, or is allowed to perform an action. On a network switch, the web interface is the control plane: whoever gets past its login checks can usually view and change configuration, VLANs and port settings.
The CVSS v4 metrics listed in the advisory point to a serious profile:
- Attack vector: network, so the attacker does not need to be on the same device or physically present.
- Attack complexity: low, with no attack requirements listed.
- Privileges required: none, and no user interaction needed.
- Impact on the vulnerable system: high for confidentiality, integrity and availability.
- No impact listed for subsequent systems.
The advisory does not say what an attacker gains in practice, so avoid assuming more than the scoring implies. A high impact across all three areas is consistent with an attacker being able to read and change switch settings and disrupt service, but that is an interpretation of the score, not a confirmed description of attacks.
Who is affected
Only the Intelbras SG 2404 PoE L2+ on firmware 1.00.70 or 1.00.72 is named. Because the flaw is in the web management interface, your real exposure depends on who can reach that interface.
| Situation | Exposure |
|---|---|
| Management page reachable from the internet | Highest. Remote attack with no privileges required and a public exploit reported. |
| Management reachable from a flat office or guest network | Elevated. Any device on that network could attempt it. |
| Management restricted to a dedicated admin VLAN or VPN | Lower, but still upgrade. |
| Firmware 1.00.74 | Fixed according to the advisory. |
PoE switches often power cameras, access points and phones, so a compromised or disrupted switch can take those devices offline too. Small businesses, branch offices and installers who deployed these switches and rarely revisit them are the most likely to be running outdated firmware.
How to check your exposure
- Find every SG 2404 PoE L2+ on your network, using your asset list, DHCP leases or device labels.
- Log in from a trusted admin machine and read the firmware version on the device's system or status page. Versions 1.00.70 and 1.00.72 are affected.
- Check whether the web management interface answers from outside your trusted network. From a machine outside the network (for example a mobile hotspot), try to reach the switch's public IP or any port forward that leads to it.
- Review your router or firewall rules for port forwards or remote-management settings that expose the switch.
What to do now
- Upgrade affected switches to firmware 1.00.74, obtaining it from Intelbras' official support channels.
- Before upgrading, export or note the current switch configuration so you can restore it if needed.
- Schedule the upgrade in a maintenance window, since a reboot interrupts traffic and PoE-powered devices.
- Remove any internet exposure of the management interface, including port forwards and remote-admin options.
- Restrict management access to a dedicated admin VLAN, a management subnet or a VPN.
- Change the admin password after upgrading and use a unique one, as a precaution if the device may already have been reached.
- Review the switch configuration for changes you did not make, such as new VLANs, unknown accounts or altered port settings.
The research describes no mitigation short of the upgrade, so treat network restriction as a way to reduce risk until you can patch, not as a replacement for the fix.
Detection and monitoring
The advisory gives no indicators of compromise, so there is no confirmed signature to hunt for. Practical steps are general ones:
- Look at any access logs on the switch or upstream firewall for unexpected requests to the management interface, particularly from external addresses.
- Watch for configuration drift: compare the running configuration against your last known good export.
- Alert on unexpected reboots, port flaps or PoE devices dropping offline, which can point to tampering or disruption.
- Keep a short inventory of network gear with firmware versions so the next advisory is quick to triage.
For broader basics on keeping small environments tidy, see our small business website security guide. If you are unsure whether a network or site has already been tampered with, how to check if a website is hacked walks through the first checks.
What we do not know yet
The research is thin, so a few points remain open:
- Whether the flaw has been used in real attacks. The advisory says a public exploit exists, but no source confirms active exploitation.
- Whether firmware versions older than 1.00.70 are affected. The advisory names only 1.00.70 and 1.00.72.
- What exactly an attacker can do after bypassing authentication on this device.
- Whether Intelbras has published its own advisory. None appears in the research, so confirm details with the vendor.
Treat 1.00.74 as the target version and verify it directly with Intelbras before rollout.
Sources
This article is based on the public sources below. Details can change as vendors and researchers publish more; check the original advisories before acting on version numbers.
