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CISA added CVE-2026-115731 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on 2026-11-17. The flaw is a deserialization of untrusted data bug in the report-processing code of Puppet, as used by Puppet Server, and it can give an attacker code execution on the server that manages your infrastructure.

If you run Puppet Enterprise or Puppet Server, especially with certificate autosigning enabled, treat this as urgent. A Puppet Server controls configuration for other machines, so a compromise there can have wide consequences.

What happened

According to the CISA KEV entry, Perforce Puppet Enterprise contains a deserialization flaw in Puppet's report-processing code. A client holding any CA-signed agent certificate can execute arbitrary code on the Puppet Server, as the service user, by submitting a report containing a crafted rich-data type through a PUT request.

The same entry adds a second condition that raises the risk: if the certificate authority automatically signs requests without strong verification, an unauthenticated network attacker can obtain a valid certificate and then exploit the flaw. The GitHub advisory was published on Nov 3, 2026, and CISA set a due date of 2026-12-01 for the required action.

The status comes from CISA's catalog listing. The sources give no details about attackers, victims or campaigns, and CISA marks ransomware use as unknown. The NVD page repeats the CISA description, so it is not separate confirmation.

Technical details in plain terms

Deserialization turns data received from outside back into live objects inside a program. If the program accepts object types chosen by the sender, a crafted input can make it build something it should never have built, and in some cases run attacker-chosen code. That is the weakness class here (CWE-502), and the outcome is code injection (CWE-94).

The CVSS v4 metrics in the GitHub advisory describe a network attack vector, low attack complexity, no attack requirements, low privileges required and no user interaction. Impact on confidentiality, integrity and availability is rated high for both the vulnerable system and subsequent systems.

The key point is the privilege level. The attacker does not need an administrator account, only an agent certificate signed by your CA. In many environments that is a low bar, and with weak autosigning, CISA says an unauthenticated attacker can obtain one.

Who is affected

  • Organizations running Puppet Server or Puppet Enterprise. The research says "affected releases" without listing versions, so you cannot rule yourself out until you read the vendor advisory.
  • Environments where the CA autosigns certificate requests without strong verification. There, an unauthenticated attacker who can reach the server over the network may obtain a certificate.
  • Environments where agent certificates are widely issued, shared or poorly tracked, since any valid CA-signed certificate is enough.
  • Hosting providers and agencies that manage client servers through Puppet, because code execution on the Puppet Server could reach the systems it manages (general reasoning, not a sourced finding).

How to check your exposure

Start with the vendor advisory for the exact affected and fixed releases: the Perforce advisory. Then establish which Puppet version you run, using your product's own version reporting or your deployment inventory, and compare it with the advisory.

As a rough inventory aid, this read-only command lists installed Debian or Ubuntu packages whose names contain "puppet". Puppet Enterprise is often installed with its own installer, so it may not appear here, and the output does not replace the version check against the advisory:

List installed packages with "puppet" in the name (Debian/Ubuntu)Shell
dpkg -l | grep -i puppet

The equivalent on RHEL and derivatives. The same caveat applies: an empty result does not mean Puppet is absent:

List installed packages with "puppet" in the name (RHEL and derivatives)Shell
rpm -qa | grep -i puppet

For autosigning, the research does not say where it is configured, so consult the Perforce advisory and the Puppet documentation for your version to learn how your CA decides which requests to sign. Autosigning can be set up in more than one way, so do not assume a single file check tells the whole story. In practice, ask who can submit a certificate request to your CA and what, if anything, verifies those requests before they are signed.

What to do now

The first two items follow the CISA and vendor guidance. The rest are general hardening and incident-response advice, not specifics taken from the advisory.

  1. Read the Perforce advisory and identify the fixed release or the vendor's mitigations for your version.
  2. Apply the vendor's update or mitigations to every Puppet Server, starting with any reachable from untrusted networks. If no mitigations are available for your product, CISA's action says to discontinue use.
  3. Review how your CA signs requests. Replace blanket autosigning with strong verification or manual approval.
  4. Restrict network access to the Puppet Server to the hosts that need it, using firewall rules.
  5. Review the list of signed certificates and revoke any you do not recognize.
  6. Review Puppet Server logs and recent reports for activity or nodes you do not recognize.
  7. If you cannot rule out exploitation, treat the server as potentially compromised: rotate credentials and secrets it holds and check managed nodes for unexpected changes.
Caution. Updating, restarting or changing certificate settings on a Puppet Server can disrupt the systems that depend on it. Schedule the work and back up your configuration and CA data first. Test certificate revocations on a small scale where you can.

CISA's required action for the KEV entry is to apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, in line with BOD 26-04, and to discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. The entry shows the field "Forensic triage required per BOD 26-04: No", while its action text still points to CISA's forensics triage guidance. Do not read that field as a reason to skip checking for compromise.

Detection and monitoring afterwards

Because exploitation would run code as the Puppet Server service user, look for signs of that account doing things it normally does not: new processes, outbound connections to unfamiliar addresses, new files or scheduled tasks, and changes to manifests or modules. This is general guidance rather than indicators published by the vendor.

  • Watch for new or unusual certificate signing events, especially at odd hours.
  • Alert on unexpected changes to your Puppet code repository and environments.
  • Track configuration drift on managed nodes; a malicious change pushed through Puppet could appear on many machines at once.
  • Keep an eye on the CISA KEV entry and the Perforce advisory for updates to versions and guidance.

For the public-facing side of your estate, Webforta Monitor can track certificate and DNS changes, and the free SSL checker lets you inspect certificates on your own hosts. These do not see inside a private Puppet deployment, so they complement the log review above rather than replace it. For broader guidance, see what to do if a website is hacked.

Timeline

Known dates from the research
DateEvent
2026-11-03CVE-2026-115731 published; advisory added to the GitHub Advisory Database
2026-11-17Added to the CISA KEV catalog
2026-12-01CISA due date for the required action

Sources

This article is based on the public sources below. Details can change as vendors and researchers publish more; check the original advisories before acting on version numbers.

  1. CVE-2026-115731 - GitHub Advisory Databasegithub.com
  2. Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog | CISAcisa.gov
  3. Perforce Puppet Enterprise Deserialization of Untrusted Data Vulnerability (CVE-2026-115731) is being actively exploitednvd.nist.gov ·
  • Puppet
  • CISA KEV
  • deserialization
  • remote code execution
  • configuration management