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A critical vulnerability, CVE-2026-76807, affects the Todoist MCP Server, a tool that lets AI agents read and change a Todoist account. When the optional HTTP server (todoist-mcp-http) is running, a malicious website can use DNS rebinding to reach it on the victim's own machine and call its tools, using the Todoist API key the server already holds. The npm package @doist/todoist-mcp is affected up to version 10.3.2, and 10.3.3 contains the fix.

If you or your developers run MCP servers locally and assume that binding to 127.0.0.1 keeps them private, this is a good case study as well as a patch notice. The same weakness class can affect any local HTTP service that does not check who is calling it.

What happened

The maintainers describe the problem in a GitHub security advisory. The self-hosted todoist-mcp-http server accepts browser-origin requests to its POST /mcp endpoint without validating the Host and Origin headers and without authenticating the caller. Per the CVE record, a malicious website can use DNS rebinding to reach the loopback listener and invoke MCP tools, which run with the server-held Todoist API key.

The stdio transport is not browser-reachable and is not affected by this attack path. Only the HTTP mode is exposed.

A note on dates: the CVE record lists publication on 2026-11-18, while the GitHub advisory page shows an original publication date of Jul 10, 2026 and an update on Nov 19, 2026. The sources do not explain the difference, so treat the exact disclosure timeline as unclear. At the time of writing, only one independent publisher covers this story, and the technical details come from the vendor advisory.

Why binding to loopback was not enough

DNS rebinding is a browser-based technique that defeats the idea that a service on 127.0.0.1 is local-only. In plain terms: an attacker controls a domain name and first points it at their own web server, so the victim's browser loads the attacker's page. Later the name is switched to resolve to 127.0.0.1. The browser still believes it is talking to the attacker's site, so the same-origin rules allow the page's scripts to send requests, yet the connection now lands on a service running on the victim's computer.

The advisory explains that the default HTTP bind target is loopback, which users reasonably treat as local-only, but that rebinding preserves the attacker's Host and Origin headers while routing the TCP connection to 127.0.0.1. A server that checks neither header cannot tell a trusted local client from a hostile web page. That maps to CWE-346 (origin validation error).

The second weakness is that the server's own authentication does not cover the caller. According to the advisory, the middleware validates the configured server-side Todoist token and then forwards the request, so it never authenticates the browser. The browser does not need a Todoist token because the server supplies its own TODOIST_API_KEY.

What an attacker could do

The advisory demonstrates task creation and completion and states that the same path exposes the rest of the registered write surface. It lists task updates and rescheduling, project and section changes, comments, reminders, filters, labels, goals, assignments, and object deletion. The CVE record also says the flaw exposes Todoist account data.

Realistically, the victim has to be running todoist-mcp-http at the moment they visit a hostile page in a browser on the same machine. That limits the number of exposed people, but the person is often a developer with an always-on local agent setup and a long-lived API key. The impact is on the Todoist account's data, not on the host operating system, as far as the sources describe.

Who is affected

  • Anyone running todoist-mcp-http from @doist/todoist-mcp version 10.3.2 or earlier.
  • Teams that start the HTTP server as a background service so AI agents can reach it, since it may be running whenever a browser is in use.
  • Not affected by this attack path: setups that only use the stdio entrypoint.

If you only use the stdio transport, this specific issue does not apply to you, though updating is still sensible.

How to check your exposure

First, find out whether the package is installed and at what version. This read-only command lists the globally installed package, if any. Look for a version of 10.3.2 or lower.

List a globally installed @doist/todoist-mcp (run on the machine that hosts the server)Shell
npm ls -g @doist/todoist-mcp

For a project-local install, run the same query without the global flag from the project directory.

List a project-local @doist/todoist-mcp (run in the project directory)Shell
npm ls @doist/todoist-mcp

The advisory shows the server being started through npx, which downloads the package on demand. If that is how you run it, check which version your start command resolves to and whether a todoist-mcp-http process is running now. This command shows matching processes; any output means the HTTP server is up.

Check for a running todoist-mcp-http process (Linux and macOS)Shell
ps aux | grep todoist-mcp-http | grep -v grep

What to do now

  1. Stop any running todoist-mcp-http process until it is updated.
  2. Update @doist/todoist-mcp to 10.3.3 or later in every place it is installed or pinned, including scripts that call it with npx.
  3. Restart the server and confirm the installed version is 10.3.3 or newer.
  4. Rotate the Todoist API key used by the server if the HTTP mode was running on a machine where you browse the web. The sources do not report exploitation, but the key was usable through the server.
  5. Review recent Todoist activity for tasks, comments or deletions you did not make.
  6. If you do not need the HTTP transport, switch to stdio, which the advisory says is not browser-reachable.

This command installs the fixed version into a project. Run it in the project directory that depends on the package.

Update the package to the fixed release (run in the project directory)Shell
npm install @doist/todoist-mcp@10.3.3
Caution. Updating and restarting the server interrupts any AI agent or automation connected to it. Plan the restart, and rotate the API key only after you have a place to store the new one.

The fix is in release v10.3.3, with the change tracked in pull request 516. We have not confirmed in the sources exactly which checks the patch adds, so rely on the version number rather than assuming a particular configuration option.

Hardening any local MCP or developer service

The lesson extends beyond Todoist. Local HTTP services that act with stored credentials should be treated like internet-facing ones.

  • Prefer stdio or Unix socket transports when a tool does not need HTTP.
  • Require a caller credential on every request, so the server's own API key is never the only gate.
  • Validate the Host and Origin headers and reject names you do not expect.
  • Keep API keys narrowly scoped and rotate them on a schedule.
  • Avoid browsing with untrusted sites on the same machine and profile that runs privileged local agents.

Detection and monitoring

The sources describe no network indicators, so detection is mostly about the Todoist account. Watch for unexpected task creation, completion, edits or deletions, especially at times you were not working. Check the Todoist activity history for the period when the HTTP server was running.

For the web properties you run, the same class of mistake shows up as services that trust any Host header. You can use the free security headers checker to review browser-facing headers, and Webforta Monitor can alert you to certificate and header changes on sites you verify. Neither addresses this local-server flaw directly; updating the package does.

For broader context on keeping developer and cloud tooling tidy, see our small business website security guide.

Sources

This article is based on the public sources below. Details can change as vendors and researchers publish more; check the original advisories before acting on version numbers.

  1. CVE-2026-76807 - GitHub Advisory Databasegithub.com
  • MCP
  • DNS rebinding
  • Todoist
  • npm
  • AI agents
  • CVE-2026-76807