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The rucio Python package (distributed on pip) has a critical authentication flaw tracked as CVE-2026-100397. According to the GitHub advisory GHSA-x585-4vv8-2mh2, a short-lived SSH challenge token is wrongly accepted as a full authentication credential, so an unauthenticated attacker can act as any account, including administrative ones.
If you run a server built on the rucio package, you should check your version and upgrade. At the time of writing only the GitHub advisory covers this issue, so the details below rest on that single primary source.
What happened
The rucio REST API can issue an SSH challenge token. It is meant to be a short-lived nonce used in a later SSH key exchange. The advisory says the token is generated from an account name supplied in a request header, and no prior authentication is required to get one.
The problem is that the code that validates authentication tokens does not tell these challenge tokens apart from real authentication tokens. A challenge token requested for, say, an administrative account is therefore accepted as proof of identity on other API endpoints. The advisory notes the challenge token lives for ten seconds, which is ample time for an automated request.
Technical details
This is a token confusion bug, a form of improper authentication. Two kinds of secret with different purposes were stored in the same database table. According to the advisory, the validation function in lib/rucio/core/authentication.py (validate_auth_token) accepts both. The authentication design is not broken in itself, but one mechanism can be used to bypass another, which is what CWE-305 describes.
The CVSS vector reflects how little an attacker needs: network access, low complexity, no privileges and no user interaction, with high impact on confidentiality, integrity and availability. We are deliberately not reproducing the request sequence here. The practical point is that anyone who can reach the auth endpoints of a vulnerable server can ask for a token naming an arbitrary account.
Who is affected
Any deployment using the rucio package from pip within these ranges is vulnerable:
| Version line | Vulnerable range | Patched version |
|---|---|---|
| 1.x to 35.x | >= 1.14.0.post1, < 35.9.1 | 35.9.1 |
| 36.x to 38.x | >= 36.0.0rc1, < 38.6.1 | 38.6.1 |
| 39.x to 40.x | >= 39.0.0rc1, < 40.4.2 | 40.4.2 |
| 41.x | >= 41.0.0rc1, < 41.1.1 | 41.1.1 |
Exposure is highest where the API is reachable from the internet or from large shared networks. Servers reachable only from a tightly controlled internal network are less exposed, but the flaw needs no credentials, so any host that can reach the API could use it.
How to check your exposure
Run this on the host or in the virtual environment or container where rucio is installed. It prints the installed rucio package version, which you compare against the table above.
pip show rucioIf you build from a requirements file or container image, also check what version is pinned there, since a rebuild could reinstall an old release. Then review whether the auth endpoints are reachable from networks that should not have access.
What to do now
- Find every rucio server, including test and staging instances, and note the installed version with pip show rucio.
- Upgrade to the patched release for your line: 35.9.1, 38.6.1, 40.4.2 or 41.1.1. Check the release notes if you want one of the later tags the advisory lists.
- Restart the rucio services after upgrading so the new code is loaded, and confirm the new version is running.
- As general hardening (not an advisory-backed mitigation), restrict network access to the API to the clients that need it, using a firewall or reverse proxy, until patching is done.
- Review API and authentication logs for requests to the SSH challenge token endpoint, especially naming administrative accounts, followed by use of the token elsewhere.
- If you see suspicious activity, review what administrator-level actions were taken, check accounts and permissions for unexpected changes, and treat data as potentially altered.
This command upgrades the package to an exact patched version. The example uses 41.1.1; substitute the fixed version for your own line (35.9.1, 38.6.1 or 40.4.2). Afterwards, run pip show rucio and confirm the version matches.
pip install --upgrade "rucio==41.1.1"Detection and monitoring
The advisory excerpt does not describe log signatures, so treat the following as sensible hunting ideas rather than confirmed indicators. Look for calls to the SSH challenge token endpoint from clients that never use SSH-based authentication, requests naming accounts such as an administrator, and a successful authenticated request arriving within seconds of such a call from the same address.
Because the challenge token is stored in the same table as ordinary tokens, unusual token records created without a matching login may also be worth a look if you have database access. For general guidance on investigating a suspected compromise, see how to check if a website is hacked and what to do when a website is hacked.
For web-facing services in general, a web application firewall can add a layer in front of an API, but it is not a substitute for patching. Webforta Monitor can alert you to certificate, DNS and header changes on the hostnames you run, which helps you notice unexpected changes around an exposed service.
Timeline
- Aug 11, 2026: the advisory was published to the rucio/rucio repository, per the GitHub page.
- Nov 13, 2026: the advisory was reviewed and published to the GitHub Advisory Database, and last updated the same day.
- Credit: the finder is listed as thebatou; the advisory publisher is listed as bziemons.
The research does not give an NVD publication date and does not say whether the flaw has been exploited, so we cannot say whether attacks have occurred.
Sources
This article is based on the public sources below. Details can change as vendors and researchers publish more; check the original advisories before acting on version numbers.
