On this page (7 sections)
Kaspersky researchers report that Retadup, a Windows worm that spreads through infected USB drives and was disrupted by French law enforcement in August 2019, is active again. Its old command-and-control (C2) domains are being used to push a new variant of the CoffeeLoader malware, according to Kaspersky's Securelist analysis, also summarized by The Hacker News.
This matters most to Windows administrators, office IT teams and agencies whose staff plug removable drives into workstations that also reach admin panels, hosting accounts or deployment tools. No CVE is involved: this is a malware campaign, not a software flaw, so there is no patch to apply. Defense is about endpoint hygiene.
What happened
Retadup was taken down by French authorities in August 2019. It spread through infected USB drives and was previously used to drop cryptocurrency miners, the Stop ransomware and the Arkei password stealer, per The Hacker News. Kaspersky says that about two years ago someone began re-registering the domain names Retadup once used as C2 servers and used them to send commands that download third-party malware.
At first the payload was the SmokeLoader downloader, packed with a 32-bit version of the Armoury packer. In early 2025, Kaspersky says, the same servers started serving CoffeeLoader. Kaspersky detected the new CoffeeLoader variant in August 2026. It remains unclear whether the worm's original author or a different actor brought the servers back online.
Kaspersky says it blocked around 15,000 systems from being infected with the resurrected worm, mostly in Peru, Angola, Russia and Bolivia. That is the vendor's own figure for its own customers, so the true number of infections is unknown.
How the new variant works
CoffeeLoader was first documented by Zscaler ThreatLabz in March 2025 and is assessed to share source code similarities with SmokeLoader, according to The Hacker News, which also describes the Armoury packer as used to resist analysis. The new infection chain, as described by Kaspersky, has several stages:
- An NSIS-based installer drops a file named 7z.dll into a temporary directory and runs it with rundll32.exe. The file is a patched copy of the legitimate 7-Zip library, with part of its code replaced by self-decrypting shellcode: a new version of the Armoury packer.
- The packer decrypts its payload on the GPU. The older version used the OpenCL library; the new one uses OpenGL.
- The packer now delivers an extra stage, a CoffeeLoader downloader, which installs persistence and fetches the main CoffeeLoader body from a hardcoded C2 server over HTTPS.
- The downloader launches one of several legitimate Windows processes (dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, svchost.exe, OpenWith.exe or AtBroker.exe) and injects itself into it. The main payload is then decrypted and run.
- CoffeeLoader can run the next-stage malware from the C2 server in three ways: injecting it into a process, saving it as an executable and running it, or saving it as a DLL and running it through rundll32.exe.
Because CoffeeLoader is a loader, the real damage depends on what the operators choose to deliver next. The portions of Kaspersky's report and the coverage reviewed for this article do not name which follow-on payloads are being served in this campaign.
Who is exposed
Exposure is limited to Windows machines that execute the malicious installer, typically after an infected USB drive is used. Servers rarely have drives plugged in, so the realistic risk is to office PCs, shared workstations, lab or kiosk machines, and laptops used by developers and site administrators. A compromised workstation can expose saved browser passwords, FTP and SSH credentials, and active sessions for CMS and hosting dashboards, which is how an endpoint infection can become a website incident. That last point is general risk reasoning, not something Kaspersky reported for this campaign.
How to check for it
Kaspersky documents specific persistence artifacts. The subfolder, library and registry value are all named with eight hexadecimal digits generated from system volume information, so the name differs per machine. The example Kaspersky gives uses b79faace, but do not search for that string alone.
| Artifact | Location or pattern |
|---|---|
| Copied library | Subfolder of %PROGRAMDATA% or %LOCALAPPDATA%, named with 8 hex digits, containing a DLL with the same name |
| Autorun entry | Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, value named after the DLL, launching it with rundll32.exe |
| Anti-removal key | Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\StartupApproved\Run, which stops the user disabling the autorun through Task Manager |
| Network | HTTPS requests to a /payload?md5= path on a C2 server; the first request uses a hash of all zeros |
This read-only PowerShell command lists the current user's Run entries. Look for a value named like an eight-character hex string with a .dll extension that calls rundll32.exe on a DLL in a ProgramData or AppData folder. Also check the machine-wide equivalent under HKLM.
Get-ItemProperty 'HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'This command lists DLL files directly inside subfolders of the two locations Kaspersky names. Look for a folder with an 8-hex-digit name that holds a DLL of the same name. A hit is a lead to investigate, not proof of infection.
Get-ChildItem -Path $env:PROGRAMDATA, $env:LOCALAPPDATA -Directory -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object { Get-ChildItem -Path $_.FullName -Filter *.dll -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue }The Securelist report has an IoC section. Compare your findings against it and feed those indicators to your endpoint tooling.
What to do now
- Run a full scan with an up-to-date endpoint security product on every Windows workstation that regularly uses removable drives.
- Check the Run keys and the ProgramData and LocalAppData folders as shown above, and compare against the indicators in the Securelist report.
- If you find a match, disconnect the machine from the network and treat it as compromised. Reinstalling Windows is the safest way to be sure a loader and anything it fetched is gone.
- From a clean device, change passwords and revoke sessions for accounts used on the affected machine: email, hosting panel, CMS admin, FTP/SSH keys, registrar and payment accounts.
- Restrict or disable USB autorun and removable storage where staff do not need it, using your existing endpoint or group policy tooling.
- Review DNS and proxy logs for the C2 domains listed in Kaspersky's IoC section, and block them. The /payload?md5= path is only visible if you perform TLS inspection, because the download happens over HTTPS and DNS logs never contain paths.
- Avoid reusing drives from unknown or shared sources, and scan any drive before opening its contents.
Detection and monitoring
Kaspersky reports that the malware injects itself into legitimate processes: dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, svchost.exe, OpenWith.exe or AtBroker.exe. As our own advice, treat the process name alone as a weak signal, and instead watch for new Run key entries that call rundll32.exe on DLLs in user-writable folders, and for these processes making outbound HTTPS connections they normally would not.
If a workstation compromise could expose your site, watch the site as well. A security scan and certificate and DNS monitoring can surface unexpected changes on your public side, though they cannot see malware on an employee's PC. The guide on what to do if your website is hacked covers the next steps if you suspect credentials were used.
What is still unknown
The research available is Kaspersky's analysis and press coverage that repeats it, so there is no independent confirmation yet. Open questions include who controls the revived domains, which payloads are being delivered beyond CoffeeLoader, and how many systems are actually infected beyond the roughly 15,000 Kaspersky says it blocked.
Sources
This article is based on the public sources below. Details can change as vendors and researchers publish more; check the original advisories before acting on version numbers.
