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A critical vulnerability, CVE-2026-125055, has been published for the Chatterbug Forms - Fast, Flexible WordPress Form Builder plugin. According to the GitHub Advisory Database entry, all versions up to and including 1.0.2 let unauthenticated visitors upload files with any extension, including .php, which can lead to remote code execution.

If you run WordPress and have this plugin installed, even on a single contact page, you should check it today. At the time of writing, the sources do not name a confirmed fixed version, so the safest assumption is that an installed copy of 1.0.2 or earlier is exposed.

What happened

The flaw was published on November 13, 2026 to the NVD and the GitHub Advisory Database. The entry is marked as unreviewed by GitHub and lists no package or patched version. The record references the plugin source on the WordPress.org Trac and a Wordfence threat intelligence entry.

Coverage is thin. The NVD record repeats the same description as the GitHub advisory, so the two should not be counted as independent confirmation. We found no reports of attacks in the wild, but a flaw with this profile (no login, network reachable, low complexity) is the kind that automated scanners tend to look for once details are public. That last point is our general observation, not a claim from the sources.

Technical details

The problem sits in the function cbforms_check_form_submissions(). Form builders usually let an administrator restrict which file types a field accepts. Here, according to the advisory, when no restriction is configured on a field, the allowed-type check falls back to the uploaded file's own extension. In effect, whatever the visitor names the file is treated as allowed, so a .php file passes.

A web server that stores such a file in a location where PHP is executed can run it on request. That is how an upload bug turns into remote code execution: the attacker gains the ability to run code as the web server user, which typically means access to the site's files and database credentials.

Why the nonce does not help

The submission is protected by a nonce, but the advisory notes that this nonce is printed inline on every public page containing a Chatterbug form. Any visitor can read it, so it is not an effective access control. A nonce is meant to guard against forged requests, not to prove a user is authorized.

What is not confirmed

  • Which version fixes the issue. A Trac changeset on trunk is referenced, but the research does not say it is a release containing a fix.
  • Whether the flaw is being exploited.
  • Where uploaded files are stored and whether the server will execute them. This depends on the plugin and your server configuration, and the sources do not describe it.

Who is affected

Any WordPress site running Chatterbug Forms 1.0.2 or earlier. The CVSS vector indicates no privileges and no user interaction are required, so an attacker does not need an account. Exposure is highest on sites where a Chatterbug form is published on a public page, because that is where the nonce is exposed. Sites that installed the plugin but never published a form may be less exposed, but the advisory does not say so, so do not rely on that.

Agencies and hosts managing many WordPress installs should search across all of them, since small form plugins are easy to forget.

How to check if you are exposed

The plugin slug in the WordPress.org repository is chatterbug-forms, as seen in the Trac references. This WP-CLI command, run from the site's root directory, lists the plugin with its status and version if it is installed. Look for a version of 1.0.2 or lower.

List the Chatterbug Forms plugin and its version (run in the WordPress root)WP-CLI
wp plugin list --name=chatterbug-forms --fields=name,status,version

Without WP-CLI, open Plugins in the WordPress admin and look for Chatterbug Forms. For a broader view across your plugins, see our guide on checking whether a WordPress plugin is vulnerable and the known vulnerabilities per plugin list.

Look for signs of abuse

This command, run from the WordPress root on Linux, lists PHP files inside the uploads directory modified in the last 30 days. Legitimate uploads rarely contain PHP, so any result deserves a closer look. It only reads and prints file names.

Find recently modified PHP files under wp-content/uploads (read-only, run in the WordPress root)Shell
find wp-content/uploads -type f -name "*.php" -mtime -30

The plugin may store files elsewhere, so also review web server access logs for unusual POST requests to pages containing a Chatterbug form, followed by requests to unfamiliar .php files. If you find anything, follow our guide on what to do when a website is hacked.

What to do now

  1. Confirm whether Chatterbug Forms is installed and which version, on every site you manage.
  2. If it is installed at 1.0.2 or earlier, deactivate and remove the plugin until the author publishes a release that is confirmed to fix CVE-2026-125055.
  3. Replace its forms with another maintained form plugin if you need the functionality, and avoid file upload fields where you can.
  4. Check the uploads directory and recent file changes for unexpected PHP files (see the command above), and keep a copy of anything suspicious for analysis.
  5. If you find a suspicious file, treat the site as compromised: restore from a clean backup, rotate WordPress admin passwords, database credentials and the salts in wp-config.php, and update all other plugins.
  6. Check the plugin's page on WordPress.org and the Wordfence entry for a patched release before reinstalling.
Caution. Removing a form plugin will break any page that displays its forms and can lose stored submissions. Export the form data you need and take a full backup before deleting it.
Tip. As a hardening measure that is independent of this bug, configure your web server to refuse to execute PHP inside wp-content/uploads. This limits what an uploaded script can do. Test on a staging copy first, since some themes and plugins legitimately rely on files there.

Detection and monitoring

After cleanup, keep watching for file changes and unexpected requests. A website firewall can filter suspicious uploads (see what a WAF is), but it is a layer of defense, not a substitute for removing a vulnerable plugin. Outside-in tools also have limits; our overview of what malware detection can and cannot see explains why a clean scan does not prove a server was never accessed.

You can run a read-only check of your public site with the free malware scanner, and use Webforta Monitor to be alerted to changes in uptime, certificates, DNS and headers. Neither replaces checking the server itself for uploaded files.

Timeline

Known dates from the sources
DateEvent
2026-11-13CVE-2026-125055 published by NVD and added to the GitHub Advisory Database (marked unreviewed)
2026-11-13GitHub entry last updated; patched versions listed as unknown

We will treat the fix status as open until the plugin author or WordPress.org confirms a patched version. Check the primary sources again before you reinstall.

Sources

This article is based on the public sources below. Details can change as vendors and researchers publish more; check the original advisories before acting on version numbers.

  1. CVE-2026-125055 - GitHub Advisory Databasegithub.com
  2. CVE-2026-125055: The Chatterbug Forms – Fast, Flexible WordPress Form Builder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Upload in all versions up to, and including…nvd.nist.gov ·
  • WordPress
  • CVE-2026-125055
  • file upload
  • plugin vulnerability
  • RCE