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CVE-2026-123710 is a critical flaw in Red Hat Quay, the container registry product. According to the GitHub Advisory Database entry, an unauthenticated client can obtain an anonymous registry token, use it against the service key rotation endpoint, and install its own approved signing key with no expiry. Tokens signed with that key are then accepted for any repository.
If you run Quay yourself, or your build and deploy pipeline pulls images from a Quay registry, this deserves attention now. At the time of writing, the sources we reviewed do not list affected or fixed versions, so the safest approach is to follow Red Hat's own advisory closely.
At a glance
What happened
The flaw was published on November 11, 2026 through the National Vulnerability Database and mirrored to the GitHub Advisory Database the same day. The description says a client with no credentials can walk through a short chain of steps and end up able to mint tokens that the registry trusts for every repository.
The result, in the words of the advisory, is read and write access to private images and the ability to replace repository tags. In practice that means an attacker could read proprietary images and also swap a tag such as a release tag to point at different content.
How the weakness works
Registries like Quay use signed tokens to decide who may pull or push which repository. The registry verifies each token against a set of trusted signing keys. Rotating those keys is a sensitive administrative operation, because whoever can add a trusted key can create tokens that the registry will honor.
According to the description, the key rotation endpoint accepted a token that any anonymous client could obtain, so an unauthenticated party could register its own key. The key was approved and had no expiry, which makes the foothold durable. The weakness is classified as CWE-1287, Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input, meaning the service did not correctly validate the kind of input or credential it was given.
The CVSS vector is AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H: reachable over the network, low complexity, no privileges, no user interaction, and high impact on confidentiality, integrity and availability.
Who is exposed
- Organizations running a self-managed Red Hat Quay registry, especially one reachable from the internet or from broad internal networks.
- Teams that deploy to production from images stored in Quay. A replaced tag could change what gets deployed.
- Anyone storing proprietary code, configuration or embedded secrets inside private images, since those could be read.
- Whether hosted Quay offerings are affected is not stated in the sources. Check with the provider.
Which Quay versions are vulnerable is not stated in what we reviewed, so assume any version you run could be affected until Red Hat's advisory says otherwise.
What to do now
- Open the Red Hat CVE page and the Bugzilla entry and note the affected and fixed versions and any mitigation.
- Record your current Quay version and plan the update to the fixed release as soon as one is available.
- Until patched, restrict network access to the registry and its key rotation endpoint to trusted networks, for example with a firewall or reverse proxy rule.
- Review the list of trusted service keys in your Quay deployment. Remove any key you do not recognize, especially ones with no expiry.
- Review recent registry audit and access logs for anonymous token requests followed by requests to the key rotation endpoint, and for unexpected pushes or tag changes.
- Compare production image digests with the digests your CI built. If a tag moved unexpectedly, treat the image as untrusted and rebuild from source.
- If you find a key you did not add, rotate your legitimate signing keys, revoke issued tokens and robot credentials, and rotate any secrets baked into private images.
How to check your exposure
Start with what you run. On an OpenShift cluster, this read-only command lists pods across namespaces so you can find Quay components and the image tags they use. Look for Quay pods and note their image versions.
oc get pods --all-namespaces -o wide | grep -i quayIf your registry sits behind a reverse proxy or load balancer, search its access logs for requests to the key rotation path. The exact path is not given in the sources, so take it from Red Hat's documentation, and replace the placeholder below with it. Any hits from unexpected clients deserve investigation.
grep -i "KEY_ROTATION_PATH" /var/log/nginx/access.logDetection and monitoring
Because a planted signing key never expires, patching alone does not remove an attacker who already got in. After updating, verify the trusted key list is clean and keep watching registry activity: pushes from unfamiliar sources, tags that change without a matching CI run, and spikes in pulls of private repositories.
Pinning deployments to image digests instead of mutable tags limits the damage from tag replacement. Signing images and verifying signatures at deploy time adds another check that does not depend on the registry alone.
If your registry has a public hostname, Webforta Monitor can watch certificate and DNS changes on it, and the free SSL checker gives a quick view of its certificate. These do not detect this flaw, but they help you notice unrelated changes around an exposed service. For a broader view of reducing exposure, see our small business website security guide.
What we do not know yet
- Which Quay versions are affected and which release fixes the issue.
- Whether the flaw is being exploited. No source reports it, and the CVE is not marked in CISA KEV.
- Whether a public proof of concept exists. The GitHub entry lists no known source code.
- Whether Red Hat has published a workaround.
We will treat the Red Hat advisory as the authority once it lists versions. Until then, limit exposure and audit your keys.
Sources
This article is based on the public sources below. Details can change as vendors and researchers publish more; check the original advisories before acting on version numbers.
