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A critical vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-119756, affects the open-source Tasmota firmware that runs on ESP8266 and ESP32 devices. According to the GitHub Advisory Database entry, a flaw in the Device Groups feature lets an unauthenticated attacker on the local network corrupt heap memory by sending crafted UDP messages.
If you run Tasmota devices at home, in an office, or in a shop or hosting environment where IoT gear shares a network with other systems, this is worth a look today. The research available so far comes from a single advisory trail, so some details (such as a fixed release number) are not yet confirmed.
What happened
The advisory, published on November 9, 2026 and repeated by NVD, describes a heap out-of-bounds write in the function SendReceiveDeviceGroupMessage(). The advisory says the crafted Device Groups messages are sent over UDP port 4447.
A crafted message can cause an internal counter named log_remaining to go negative. Writes then exceed a fixed 512-byte buffer and corrupt heap memory. The fix is referenced as commit e97e1e4 in the Tasmota repository, and a VulnCheck advisory is also referenced.
Technical details in plain terms
This is a classic memory-safety bug. The code tracks how much room is left in a fixed-size buffer. If a malicious message pushes that counter below zero, the limit no longer holds, and data lands outside the 512-byte area. The research lists the weakness as CWE-805 but does not describe what that identifier covers.
The stated impact is a device crash or, potentially, native code execution. The advisory notes that ESP8266 and ESP32 platforms lack ASLR and heap cookies, two common protections that make heap corruption harder to turn into reliable code execution. The word potentially matters: the research does not describe a working exploit or any confirmed takeover of a device.
On scoring, the CVSS v4 metrics shown in the GitHub Advisory Database list the attack vector as Network, with low complexity, no privileges and no user interaction, and high impact on confidentiality, integrity and availability of the vulnerable system. The description, however, limits the attacker to the local network. In practice, treat any device whose UDP port 4447 is reachable by an untrusted party as exposed.
Who is affected
- Owners of Tasmota firmware up to and including 16.0.0 that includes the Device Groups feature.
- Devices based on ESP8266 and ESP32 chips, which the advisory names specifically.
- Networks where untrusted devices share a segment with IoT gear, such as guest Wi-Fi, flat office networks, or a compromised laptop or phone on the same LAN.
- Anyone who has forwarded UDP 4447 from the internet to a device. The advisory describes a local network attacker, but a port forward would remove that boundary.
The research does not say whether Device Groups must be explicitly configured before the vulnerable code is reachable. Until that is clarified, assume every device running an affected build could be exposed.
How to check your exposure
Start with an inventory. List every Tasmota device and note the firmware version shown in its web interface or console. Anything at 16.0.0 or earlier, or built from source before commit e97e1e4, should be treated as affected.
Next, see which devices answer on the Device Groups port. The command below runs an nmap UDP scan of port 4447 against your own IoT subnet from a Linux or macOS machine on that network. Open or open|filtered results point to devices worth investigating. Replace the address range with your own, and only scan networks you own or administer.
sudo nmap -sU -p 4447 192.168.1.0/24UDP scans can report open|filtered when a device does not reply, so treat the output as a lead rather than proof. Also check your router's port forwarding rules to confirm UDP 4447 is not forwarded to the internet.
What to do now
- Inventory all Tasmota devices and record their firmware versions.
- Check the Tasmota repository and release notes for a build that includes commit e97e1e4, and update affected devices to it. The research names the commit but not a fixed release number.
- If you compile Tasmota yourself, rebuild from source that contains commit e97e1e4 and reflash.
- Put IoT devices on a separate VLAN or guest network, away from laptops, servers and anything holding business data.
- Block UDP 4447 at the router or firewall for any traffic that does not come from your trusted Tasmota devices, and make sure it is never forwarded from the internet.
- If you do not use Device Groups, keep those devices isolated until they are patched, since the research does not confirm whether the feature can be disabled to avoid the flaw.
- Watch for devices that reboot unexpectedly, as a crash is the most likely visible sign of a failed attack attempt.
Detection and monitoring
The research gives no indicators of compromise and no sign of exploitation in the wild, so there is no known signature to hunt for. Practical signals are indirect: repeated unexplained restarts of a Tasmota device, devices dropping off the network, or unexpected UDP traffic to port 4447 from hosts that are not part of your device groups. Router or firewall logs that record denied UDP 4447 traffic are a useful place to look.
If any of your Tasmota devices sit on a network that also serves a website or online store, remember the wider picture. Keep your public-facing systems monitored for certificate, DNS and header changes with a tool such as Webforta Monitor, and review our guide on small business website security for general hygiene. A compromised IoT device on the same network is a stepping stone, not the end goal.
What is still unknown
- No fixed release version is named, only commit e97e1e4.
- The GitHub advisory lists affected and patched versions as unknown and is marked unreviewed.
- No public exploitation or proof-of-concept is described in the research.
- It is unclear whether the vulnerable path is reachable only when Device Groups is configured.
- The research does not say which organization assigned the CVSS score.
We will treat this as an evolving story. Check the Tasmota repository and the linked advisories for updates, especially a tagged release that contains the fix. For more security news and analysis, browse the Webforta blog.
Sources
This article is based on the public sources below. Details can change as vendors and researchers publish more; check the original advisories before acting on version numbers.
