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A critical flaw tracked as CVE-2026-117691 affects the SAML HTTP-Redirect binding implementation in Keycloak, the open source identity and access management server. According to the GitHub Advisory Database entry, the server can be tricked into processing an unsigned SAML message instead of a legitimately signed one, which can lead to full account takeover of federated users.

If you run Keycloak with SAML, this is worth checking today. The published advisory does not yet list affected or fixed versions, so the first job is to find out where you use SAML and watch for a vendor update.

What the flaw is

SAML is a standard that lets one system vouch for a user to another. With the HTTP-Redirect binding, the SAML message travels in URL query parameters, and a signature over those parameters is meant to prove the message was not forged or altered.

The advisory describes a mismatch between two behaviors in Keycloak. The server processes percent-encoded parameter names, for example %53AMLResponse, which decodes to SAMLResponse. The signature verification logic, however, only checks literal parameter names. An attacker can use that discrepancy to supply a crafted, unsigned message that the server processes instead of the legitimately signed one.

This is a classic parser differential. Two parts of a system interpret the same input differently, so the security check ends up validating something other than what the application acts on. The advisory classifies it as CWE-347, improper verification of a cryptographic signature.

How severe is it?

The advisory lists the vector as CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N, a score of 9.1. In plain terms, it can be attacked over the network, with low complexity, no privileges and no user interaction. The impact is high for confidentiality and integrity, with no availability impact.

The stated outcome is full account takeover of federated users. The advisory does not describe any other impact.

The GitHub entry is marked Unreviewed, lists no package, and shows affected and patched versions as Unknown. The NVD record repeats the same text, so there is effectively one source so far. Treat details as preliminary until Keycloak or Red Hat publish fixed versions.

Who is realistically exposed

The advisory says only that the SAML HTTP-Redirect binding implementation of Keycloak is affected. It does not say whether Keycloak must be acting as a SAML identity provider, a broker for an external SAML provider, or something else, so treat any Keycloak deployment that uses SAML as potentially in scope until the vendor clarifies.

  • Teams running Keycloak with any SAML clients or SAML-based login configured.
  • Agencies and hosting providers that operate Keycloak on behalf of clients.
  • Anyone whose users sign in through federation, since federated users are the ones the advisory says can be taken over.

Deployments that use only OpenID Connect and have no SAML configured are not described by the advisory, but confirm that rather than assume it.

How to check your exposure

Start with an inventory. You need to know which Keycloak instances you run, which version each one is, and whether SAML is in use.

  1. List every Keycloak server you operate, including test and staging instances that are reachable from the internet.
  2. Note the version of each one from the admin console or your deployment manifests.
  3. In each realm, review the Clients list for clients using the SAML protocol, and review Identity Providers for SAML entries.
  4. Check whether those endpoints are reachable from outside your network.
  5. Review authentication logs for federated logins that do not match a normal sign-in flow.

The following read-only command searches an access log for the literal percent-encoded example given in the advisory, %53AMLResponse, ignoring case. Run it on the server or log host that holds your Keycloak or reverse proxy access log, and replace the path with your own. Any matching line is worth a closer look. No match does not prove safety, because other encodings of the parameter name are possible.

Search an access log for the advisory's example %53AMLResponse (read-only, run on the log host)Shell
grep -i '%53AMLResponse' /path/to/access.log

What to do now

No fixed version is named in the sources at the time of writing, so combine monitoring for an update with measures that reduce exposure.

  1. Inventory all Keycloak instances and identify which use SAML.
  2. Watch the Keycloak project, the Red Hat CVE page and the Bugzilla entry for fixed versions, then update promptly.
  3. Restrict who can reach your SAML endpoints where practical, for example to your own applications or known partner networks.
  4. Review recent logins of high-privilege federated accounts and review or end their sessions if anything looks odd.
  5. Keep Keycloak and reverse proxy access logs so you can investigate later.
  6. If you suspect misuse, rotate credentials, invalidate sessions for affected users, and follow your incident process.
Caution. Changing network access rules or client settings on a live identity provider can lock users out of every application that depends on it. Test in staging and plan a rollback before touching production.
Tip. A web application firewall can add a layer in front of Keycloak, but it is not a substitute for the vendor fix, and whether any rule would catch this issue is not established in the sources. Read what a WAF is to see what it can and cannot cover.

Monitoring after you patch

Once an update is available, confirm the new version is running on every instance, not just the main one. Keep an eye on sign-in activity for several weeks, since a forged login can look like a normal session afterwards.

Because single sign-on endpoints are public by nature, it also helps to watch the basics around them. Webforta Monitor can track certificate, DNS and uptime changes on your login hostnames, and the free SSL checker gives a quick look at the certificate your login host serves. These do not detect or fix this flaw; they cover the surrounding hygiene.

What we do not know yet

  • Which Keycloak versions are affected, and which release fixes the issue.
  • Whether the flaw has been exploited in the wild. The sources do not say, and the CVE is not listed in CISA KEV.
  • Whether proof-of-concept code exists. None is referenced.
  • Which Keycloak roles or configurations are required beyond use of the SAML HTTP-Redirect binding implementation.

We will not guess at these. If the vendor advisory adds versions or exploitation details, check it first and update your plan accordingly.

Sources

This article is based on the public sources below. Details can change as vendors and researchers publish more; check the original advisories before acting on version numbers.

  1. CVE-2026-117691 - GitHub Advisory Databasegithub.com
  2. CVE-2026-117691: A flaw was found in the SAML HTTP-Redirect binding implementation of Keycloak.nvd.nist.gov ·
  • Keycloak
  • SAML
  • CVE-2026-117691
  • authentication
  • identity