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On November 5, 2026, Johannes Ullrich of the SANS Internet Storm Center wrote up an exploit attempt captured in his honeypot data. He suspects it targets CVE-2023-20198, the Cisco IOS XE web UI flaw disclosed in October 2023. He notes it is nothing new, but it is a reminder that old network-device bugs keep being probed years later.
If you run Cisco IOS XE routers or switches, or manage them for clients, this is a prompt to confirm the web UI is not reachable from the internet and that the devices are on fixed software.
What was seen in the honeypot
The SANS diary shows a POST request to the path /%77ebui_wsma_https, a SOAP/XML body for the Cisco WSMA exec interface, and a harmless-looking test command (uname -a). The author says he suspects this is for CVE-2023-20198 but does not claim to have confirmed the target. The request was not an attack that compromised anything; it was captured by a honeypot.
Two details are worth knowing. First, the scanner sent opt-out headers (Opt-Out-Email and Opt-Out-Url) pointing to a commercial exposure management platform, RootEvidence. The author could not find a standard for these headers and says it was the first time he had seen them. Second, the request URL-encodes the letter w in the path. The author speculates that some WAFs might be fooled by this, which is his opinion rather than a tested result.
The weakness in plain terms
The web UI is an embedded management tool that ships in the default IOS XE image, so it needs no extra license or install. According to Cisco's advisory, attackers used two previously unknown issues. The first, CVE-2023-20198, let a remote, unauthenticated attacker create a local account with privilege level 15. The second, CVE-2023-20273, let that account escalate to root and write an implant to the file system.
The weakness class for CVE-2023-20198 is CWE-420, Unprotected Alternate Channel: a primary channel is protected, but another path to the same function is not. The CVSS vector in the GitHub advisory is network-reachable, low complexity, no privileges and no user interaction, which explains the 10.0 score. The same page shows an EPSS score of 99.613%, an estimate of exploitation likelihood.
Who is realistically exposed
- Devices running IOS XE (Release 16 or later) with ip http server or ip http secure-server in the configuration.
- Devices where that web UI is reachable from the internet or other untrusted networks, which is the condition in Cisco's original warning.
- Devices that were exposed in 2023 and never checked for compromise, even if they were later upgraded. The research does not say whether upgrading removes an existing implant or rogue account, so these devices should be checked against Cisco's indicators of compromise.
Cisco states there are no workarounds. Its advisory also points to a Recommendations section with steps to close the attack vector. The content of that section was not part of the material reviewed here, so read it in the advisory and follow it.
How to check your exposure
This read-only command, taken from Cisco's advisory, runs on the device CLI. If either ip http server or ip http secure-server appears in the output, the web UI is enabled.
show running-config | include ip http server|secure|activeCisco notes that if ip http server is present together with ip http active-session-modules none, the flaws are not exploitable over HTTP. Likewise, ip http secure-server with ip http secure-active-session-modules none means they are not exploitable over HTTPS. Do not rely on this alone; as general hardening, turning the web UI off where it is not needed, or restricting it to a trusted management network, reduces exposure further.
Look for signs of compromise
Cisco lists these log indicators. Search your device logs and any central syslog for them:
- %SYS-5-CONFIG_P messages showing configuration by process SEP_webui_wsma_http, where the user is cisco_tac_admin, cisco_support, or any local user you do not recognize.
- %SEC_LOGIN-5-WEBLOGIN_SUCCESS messages for unknown users or unexpected source addresses.
- %WEBUI-6-INSTALL_OPERATION_INFO messages showing an Install Operation: ADD with a filename that does not match an expected installation.
Cisco also references a command from Cisco Talos to check for the implant itself. Take that command from the advisory directly rather than from a third party.
What to do now
- Run the show running-config command above on every IOS XE device and list those with the web UI enabled.
- Read the Recommendations section of the Cisco advisory and follow its steps to close the attack vector.
- As general hardening, if the web UI is not needed, remove the ip http server and ip http secure-server configuration. If you need it, restrict it to a trusted management network and never expose it to the internet.
- Use the Software Checker in the Cisco advisory to confirm you are on a fixed release, and upgrade if not.
- Review local user accounts for any you do not recognize and compare them with your records.
- Search logs for the three message types listed above, going back as far as your retention allows.
- If you find indicators, treat the device as compromised: follow Cisco's guidance and your incident process, and rotate credentials that passed through it.
- Check your perimeter firewall or access lists to confirm management ports are not reachable from outside.
Detection and monitoring afterwards
Scanning from outside shows what an attacker sees. Check your public IP ranges for open HTTP and HTTPS management ports on network gear, and alert on any change. The Webforta Scan service can run read-only scans of websites you verify, and Webforta Monitor can watch uptime, certificate and DNS changes, which helps you notice unexpected exposure on hosts you own. Neither replaces checking the devices themselves.
Forward device logs to a central system and alert on the indicator messages above. If your web servers or applications sit behind a WAF, do not assume it protects network devices, and do not assume it will catch encoded paths; the encoding trick in the SANS sample is the author's speculation, not a tested bypass. For background, see what a WAF is.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2023-10-16 | Cisco first publishes its advisory; CVE-2023-20198 published to NVD |
| 2023-11-01 | Cisco advisory reaches final version 2.6, with fixed releases and Software Checker |
| 2026-11-05 | SANS ISC publishes a honeypot capture of a likely CVE-2023-20198 scan |
Sources
This article is based on the public sources below. Details can change as vendors and researchers publish more; check the original advisories before acting on version numbers.
